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2.1  Introduction 
How do shocks in a country transmit  to the rest of the world? What is 
the appropriate  response  of monetary  policy?  Do optimal  policy strate- 
gies change when an economy becomes more globalized? Do they re- 
quire  coordination  among central  banks? 
In  the attempt  to answer  these and similar  queries,  the past decade  has 
witnessed rapid and substantial developments in the literature on 
macroeconomic  stabilization in closed and open economies. Despite 
important  differences  in emphasis  and style, a number  of tightly  related 
research agendas  -  from the new neoclassical synthesis to the neo- 
Wicksellian  monetary economics to the new open economy macro- 
economics (NOEM),  and so on  -  have shed light on the mechanism 
of transmission  and propagation  of supply and demand shocks in the 
presence  of imperfectly  competitive  markets  and price/ wage rigidities. 
Building  on these premises,  a new generation  of multicountry  dynamic 
stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  models for scenario  analysis  and 
policy evaluation have recently found fertile grounds among central 
banks  and policy institutions. 
The  objective  of this paper  is to introduce  an intuitive  graphical  appa- 
ratus to help understand  and communicate  some of the key results of 
these research  strands.  We make no attempt to provide an exhaustive 
overview of the literature  (a task well beyond the scope of a simple 
geometry).  Rather,  based on our direct  experience  in classrooms,  confer- 
ences, and policy presentations  over the years, we are confident  that a 
broad  audience  of scholars  and policy analysts  would welcome a graph- 
ical  tool set to inspect  the mechanism  and convey important  results  from 
more  complex  models in a direct,  transparent,  and immediate  fashion. 
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overs and cross-country  interdependencies,  a research  field in which an- 
alytical  complexities  can reach  formidable  peaks and hinder  access  to  - 
and communication  of  -  its basic results beyond a restricted  niche of 
acolytes.  Not surprisingly,  graphical  tools have underlaid  the popular- 
ity of more traditional  teaching  and research  material  in open economy 
macroeconomics  for decades. While the textbook  treatment  of the aug- 
mented IS-LM  approach  to visualize the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch 
model is unlikely to be superseded soon, alternative  approaches  that 
bridge  frontier  research  and pedagogical  objectives  are  definitely  viable. 
This is a first  pass in that direction. 
Transparency  and immediacy  are achieved in what follows by focus- 
ing on a highly stylized model with very specific  properties.  In fact,  we 
choose to parameterize  households' preferences  and firms'  technology 
in such a way to maintain  analytical  tractability  and concentrate  on the 
substance of the argument without sacrificing  theoretical  coherence. 
Also, in characterizing  macroeconomic  uncertainties,  we restrict  our 
attention  to a very limited set of shocks.  Needless to say, restrictions  on 
the model's specification  may well hamper  the degree of realism  of our 
framework.  But to a very large extent the general principles  conveyed 
by our analysis are quite robust,  and go through  -  mutatis  mutandis  - 
in more articulated  models. 
By the same token, intertemporal  considerations  are kept at a mini- 
mum in our analysis:  whenever possible, we choose to make our points 
in terms of static  concepts (say,  prices and output) rather  than dynamic 
ones (inflation  and growth),  confident  that  our analytical  results  will be 
easily reinterpreted  in terms  of deviations  from  nominal  and real  trends. 
Very  few equations  -  and only extremely  intuitive  ones  -  appear  in the 
main text. Readers  interested  in analytical  details are referred  to the ap- 
pendices of the paper  (available  online or in Corsetti  and Pesenti  2005b), 
where full-fledged  versions of the models described  in the main text are 
available. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the basic 
macroeconomic  model in closed economy,  with flexible  prices  and nom- 
inal rigidities. Section 2.3 extends the model to interdependent  open 
economies, discussing cross-border  market  segmentation  and nominal 
rigidities in export markets. Section 2.4 analyzes the macroeconomic 
transmission mechanism, revisiting the traditional view  of the role 
played by exchange rate movements. Section 2.5 considers optimal 
monetary  policy under discretion  and its implications  for the relation- 
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monetary  policy under  commitment  and discusses the desirability  of in- 
ternational  policy coordination.  Section  2.7 concludes. 
2.2  A Basic Model of Output and Prices 
2.2.1  Preferences,  Technology,  and  Market  Structure 
We start  by developing a stylized macroeconomic  model for a closed 
economy without external  trade  in goods or assets. The population  size 
is normalized  to one, so that  we can use the same notation  for aggregate 
and per capita variables.  The economy consists of households, firms, 
and the government. 
Households have identical  preferences.  They derive utility from con- 
suming the products  supplied by the firms,  and disutility from supply- 
ing labor to the firms in exchange for wage incomes. At any point in 
time, utility U is equal to: 
U = lnC-K€  (1) 
where C is consumption  and € is hours worked. The  consumption  good 
C  is a basket  of many product  varieties  (or  brands),  and households con- 
sume all available  varieties  supplied by the firms.  The  parameter  k mea- 
sures the discomfort  associated with labor effort, so that the marginal 
rate  of substitution  between consumption  and leisure is: 
§1 Ol  \dU=0 
=kC  (2) 
Ol  \dU=0 
Firms  have identical  technologies.  They  produce  their  goods by using 
labor supplied by the households as the only input in production. 
Households  own the firms,  and receive  their  profits  as dividend income. 
Productivity  (output  per unit labor)  is subject  to economy-wide shocks. 
The  labor  market  is assumed to be perfectly  competitive:  real  wages are 
equal to productivity. 
Each  firm  produces  a single variety  of the consumption  good, and no 
other  firm  produces  the same variety:  each firm  has therefore  some mo- 
nopoly power over its product.  However, each firm competes with all 
the remaining  firms, since consumers consider each firm's  brand as a 
substitute  -  however imperfect  -  to all other  available  brands. 
As firms  have market  power over the supply of their products, they 
set prices  to maximize  their  profits,  keeping  into account  the elasticity  of 
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are fully flexible (a meaningful assumption over a long-term  horizon), 
and another  in which we allow for  nominal  price  rigidities  (a realistic  as- 
sumption  in the short  run,  say over the time horizon  of a business  cycle). 
In the latter  case, for simplicity  we assume that firms  preset the price  of 
their own products  before the shocks are observed, and stand ready to 
meet current  demand at this price for any realization  of the shocks. 
The  government  includes  both the central  bank  in charge  of monetary 
policy and the fiscal authorities.  Throughout  our analysis we abstract 
from public consumption so that fiscal policymakers  only redistribute 
revenue across  agents. 
2.2.2  Consumption  and Employment 
Our model can be synthesized by means of three schedules, as illus- 
trated  in figure 2.1:  Aggregate Demand [AD], Aggregate Supply [AS], 
and the Natural Rate [NR].1  Figure  2.1 plots labor  effort € on the hori- 
zontal axis and consumption  C on the vertical  axis. 
Let P denote the consumer  price index associated  with the consump- 
tion basket C;  that is, an average of the prices of all consumption  vari- 
eties.  Without  investment  or government  spending,  C  coincides  with ag- 
gregate  demand in real  terms,  while PC  is aggregate  nominal  spending. 
Figure 2.1 
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Let |x denote a variable  that synthesizes the effect of current  and ex- 
pected  future  monetary  policy (whatever  the specific  policy instruments 
used) on aggregate  nominal spending PC. We can refer to |x as the ag- 
gregate  monetary  stance of the country.2  The Aggregate Demand (AD) 
equation  can then be written  as: 
C  = 
J.  0) 
In terms  of figure 2.1, the AD schedule is a horizontal  line. A monetary 
ease (higher |jl)  provides nominal stimulus to the economy. Given the 
price  level P, a higher  monetary  stance |x  translates  into higher  real  con- 
sumption  C.  By the same token,  given the monetary  stance |x,  consump- 
tion is high when agents'  purchasing  power is strong;  that is, when the 
price  level is low. 
Next, let Z denote labor productivity.  The Aggregate Supply (AS) 
equation  relates  output (that  in closed economy is equal to real  domestic 
expenditure)  to total  employment  measured  in terms  of hours  worked: 
C = Z(.  (4) 
Holding employment i constant,  shocks to productivity  Z lead to fluc- 
tuations in aggregate output C. In figure 2.1, the AS schedule is a ray 
from  the origin  with slope determined  by the productivity  parameter  Z: 
higher  productivity  translates  into a steeper  line. 
At any point in time, the intersection  between AD and AS determines 
the equilibrium  allocation  of consumption  C and labor £ for given val- 
ues of the exogenous variables  |jl  and Z, as well as for a given price  level 
P. Of course,  the price  level is an endogenous variable  in our system.  We 
therefore  need to analyze  how firms  optimally  set their  prices.  Note that 
all firms  are symmetric  and face similar  technologies,  so that  in equilib- 
rium they all charge  the same price for their  products. 
2.2.3  Flexible Prices 
Consider  first  the case in which prices  are  perfectly  flexible  and adjust  in 
response to supply and demand interactions  in the product market  (as 
indexed by the superscript flex). Imperfectly competitive firms set 
prices  by charging  an optimal  markup  over their  marginal  costs. Labor 
is the only input in production,  so that  marginal  costs are  labor  costs per 
unit of product;  that  is, the wage rate  (here  denoted  by W)  divided by la- 
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The  markup  charged  by a firm  is a function  of its monopoly power in 
the product market.  Let 6 denote the elasticity  of substitution  between 
different  varieties  of the consumption  good. It is assumed that  6 is suffi- 
ciently large  -  to capture  the idea that consumption  varieties  are good 
substitutes for each other  -  but not too large (otherwise all varieties 
would substantially  be similar  in the eye of the consumers,  and a firm 
would have no monopoly power at all in setting  the price  of its product). 
Specifically,  we assume 1 < 6 < <*>. 
The optimal  price charged  by the representative  firm  will then be: 
markup  marg.  costs 
0  W 
pta-FT  Y-  (5) 
Interpreting  the expression  above, if the elasticity  of substitution  6 were 
very high, prices would be equal to marginal  costs W/Z. But if 6 were 
relatively small (close to one), firms  would face very inelastic  demand 
curves for their  products,  and would be able to exploit their  significant 
market  power by charging  extremely  high prices  relative  to the produc- 
tion costs. 
Moreover,  with a perfectly  competitive  labor  market,  the equilibrium 
wage rate  in units of consumption  (W/P) must be equal to the marginal 
rate  of substitution  between consumption  and leisure  of the representa- 
tive agent according  to (2):3 
W  -  = kC.  (6) 
Combining (5) and (6), in equilibrium  the profit-maximizing  product 
price  Pflex  is determined  as follows: 
1  Dflex  = 




*  (7\  (7) 
Now, replacing C with Z€ according  to (4) in the previous expression 
and rearranging,  we obtain: 
<~-*  (8) 
Equation  (8) defines the natural  or potential  rate  of employment,  €, as 
the level of employment that would prevail in an economy without 
nominal rigidities. The natural rate depends on agents' preferences 
about leisure,  as captured  by the parameter  k:  the lower is k, the higher 
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pends  on the monopolistic  distortions  in the economy:  the higher is 0, 
the lower is the equilibrium markup, and the higher is the equilibrium 
level  of employment.4 Observe that, while  the natural rate of employ- 
ment is constant, the natural rate of output Zt, (defined as output in an 
economy without nominal rigidities) will fluctuate as a function of pro- 
ductivity shocks Z. 
In figure 2.1, we plot equation (8) as the third schedule NR or Natural 
Rate: a vertical line above the constant €. In the flex-price equilibrium, 
the AD and AS schedules  cross each other corresponding  to the natural 
rate of employment.  Once C and € are determined  at the intersection of 
AS and NR, the price level P adjusts for any level of the current mone- 
tary stance jjl  to make sure that AD intersects the other two schedules  at 
the equilibrium point. 
2.2  A  Nominal  Rigidities 
Macroeconomic adjustment is quite different with nominal price rigidi- 
ties. Consider the case in which firms preset their prices and are unable 
to modify  them once they observe  the actual realizations  of W and Z. 
Under these conditions,  the optimally  chosen  price level5 depends  on 
expected  marginal costs.6 
Of course, when  prices are preset, unanticipated  changes  in marginal 
costs can reduce or raise the ex-post profits of the firm.7 
We now  show  that, in a sticky-price  environment,  employment  is 
equal to the natural rate only  in expected  terms. To see this, recall that 
W = kPC and PC = |x from (6) and (3). Combine these expressions  with 
(9) to rewrite the optimal product price as follows: 
Next, multiply both sides by C and use (4) and (3) to write: 
Rearranging and taking expectations, we obtain: 
/e-1  [l/Z  \  9-1  - 




[l/Z  \  = -  9-1 
6k 
-  = €. 
- 
(12) 
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An intuitive interpretation  of (12) is that firms choose prices so as to 
insure that, on average, they will operate on their flex-price supply 
curve.  If  P is set at a level below (10),  market  demand  for  the firms'  goods 
turns out to be excessively high, and they need to hire labor  above € to 
meet demand at unchanged  prices, sacrificing  their  profits.  If P is set at 
an excessively high level, firms'  sales revenue turns out to be too low 
and t falls below €. In equilibrium,  expected employment  is equal to its 
natural  rate.  We  will return  to this point later  in figure  2.11.8 
To sum up: the Aggregate Demand equation (3) relates nominal 
spending to the monetary  policy stance. The Aggregate Supply equa- 
tion (4) relates  aggregate  supply to employment.  Prices  in the short  run 
are  set such that,  in expectation,  the economy operates  along the Natural 
Rate equation (12). In the long run, when prices are flexible, the 'NR' 
equation  determines  labor  €, the AS equation  determines  consumption 
C given € and Z, and the AD equation (3) determines  the price level P 
given C and |x. 
2.2.5  Welfare  Considerations 
With  the help of our graphical  apparatus,  we can  analyze  the welfare  im- 
plications of macroeconomic  shocks and changes in structural  param- 
eters that shift the three schedules in figure 2.1. Having specified the 
utility function as in (1), the indifference  curves in the space (€, C) are 
convex and upward sloping, with slope proportional  to consumption 
according  to (2). In figure  2.1 the dashed curve is the indifference  curve 
associated  with the equilibrium  O. Utility is increasing  as we move up- 
wards or westwards, corresponding  to higher consumption levels for 
any given labor  effort,  or lower labor  effort  for any given consumption 
level. 
In the presence  of monopolistic  distortions  in the product  market,  an 
economy operating  at the natural  rate  £ will not be Pareto  efficient:9  the 
equilibrium  level of employment and output will be suboptimally  low, 
as firms  contract  their  supply of goods to exploit their  monopoly power 
and maximize  their  profits. 
We  can provide a simple graphical  representation  of this point. In fig- 
ure 2.1, the indifference  curve that goes through the equilibrium  point 
crosses the AS locus from above. That  is, at the equilibrium  C = Z€, the 
marginal  rate  of substitution  (measured  by the slope of the indifference 
curve of the representative  household) is smaller  than  the marginal  rate 
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dc\  e-i  e-i  -  _  = kC|,.7  = kZ -  -  = Z -  -  < Z.  (13) 
at  \du=o,e=e  _  t)K  b 
Intuitively,  in equilibrium  agents  work  and consume  too little,  so that  the 
additional  disutility  from  a small  increase  in labor  effort  is lower than  the 
additional  utility  from  higher  revenue.  This  illustrates  a general  and cru- 
cial feature  of economies  with monopolistic  power in production. 
In the absence of monopolistic distortions, the equilibrium in the 
model would correspond  to a point in which the indifference  curve is 
tangent to the AS locus. To see this, assume that product varieties are 
highly substitutable  (i.e., let 6 become infinitely large, so that the mo- 
nopoly power of firms  is arbitrarily  small and the economy approaches 
perfect competition). Expression (13) shows that in equilibrium the 
slope of the indifference  curve  will be identical  to the slope of the AS lo- 
cus, and equal to Z. Indeed, the competitive (and Pareto-efficient)  level 
of employment  is 1  / k > €. In section  2.5  we reconsider  the difference  be- 
tween natural  (point O in figure  2.10)  and competitive  (point  X in figure 
2.10)  output, and its implications  for the choice of monetary  policy un- 
der discretion. 
2.2.6  The  Effects  of Nominal and Real Shocks  under  Flexible  Prices 
We  can now use our apparatus  to analyze the macroeconomic  effects of 
monetary  and productivity  shocks (Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans 
1999,  2005;  Clarida,  Gali, and Gertler  2000;  Gali 2003;  Goodfriend  and 
King  2001;  Walsh  2003;  Woodford  2003).  Throughout  the analysis,  we fo- 
cus on positive  shocks,  defined as unexpected  increases  in |x  and Z (with 
the understanding  that the analysis of negative shocks would be per- 
fectly symmetric). 
When  prices  are fully flexible,  as in (7),  the effects  of monetary  shocks 
(exogenous  changes  in jlx)  are  straightforward:  nothing  changes  in terms 
of real  equilibrium  allocation.  In fact,  to the extent  that |x  and P move in- 
stantaneously  in the same  proportion,  consumption  remains  unchanged. 
Consider  now a productivity  boom under flexible  prices.  In this case, 
an increase  in Z does not affect the equilibrium  level of employment, 
which remains  constant  at €. Instead,  a shock to Z raises  proportionally 
the equilibrium  level of output  for  a given €, generating  excess supply in 
the economy. If nominal spending |x (and the wage rate W) does not 
change, marginal costs fall, reflecting higher productivity.  The price 
level P then falls  enough to boost consumption  demand to the new level 
of output. 74  Corsetti  and Pesenti 
Figure 2.2 
Productivity shocks with and without  price rigidities 
Figure  2.2 illustrates  graphically  the effect of the positive productiv- 
ity shock just described.  Let O be the initial equilibrium  allocation.  An 
increase  in Z tilts the AS locus upwards:  higher productivity  raises the 
level of consumption that is sustainable for any given employment 
level. With employment at € and no change in the monetary  stance |x, 
prices fall in response to the excess supply, shifting the AD locus up- 
ward. The new equilibrium,  A in the figure,  corresponds  to an increase 
in consumption  (measured  by the segment OA)  and lower prices,  while 
employment  remains  unchanged  at its natural  rate  €. 
2.2.7  Sticky Prices and the Effectiveness  of Monetary  Policy 
What do the data say about the equilibrium  response to productivity 
shocks?  While the issue has not been controversy-free  from a method- 
ological  viewpoint, the empirical  consensus  is that  technology  improve- 
ments are to some extent contractionary  on impact. This evidence can 
hardly  be reconciled  with the adjustment  process implied by flex-price 
models and synthesized in the previous paragraph  (Basu,  Fernald,  and 
Kimball  2006). Instead, models in which prices are sticky in the short 
run provide a simple analytical framework consistent with the styl- 
ized facts. 
If P cannot adjust, aggregate demand is pinned down by monetary The  Simple  Geometry  of Transmission  and Stabilization  75 
policy (x;  without a change in nominal spending, consumption is con- 
stant  in real  terms  in the short  term.  Hence, fluctuations  in productivity 
that  are  not matched  by changes  in aggregate  demand  necessarily  trans- 
late into changes in short-run  employment and output. Relative  to the 
natural  rate of employment and output, a positive productivity shock 
opens both an employment  gap and an output gap. 
Figure  2.2 illustrates  these points. Without  price flexibility,  a produc- 
tivity shock that rotates  the AS locus upwards does not translate  into a 
fall in prices, and therefore  is not matched by a proportional  upward 
movement of the AD locus. Unless |x  is raised  by the monetary  authori- 
ties, the new short-run  equilibrium  will correspond to the point B in 
which the new AS locus crosses the (unchanged)  AD locus. Comparing 
the short-run  equilibrium  B with the initial  equilibrium  O, employment 
falls below € while output and spending remain unchanged, both in 
nominal  and in real  terms.  Agents are  able to maintain  the same level of 
consumption  in spite of a loss of wage incomes, thanks to higher divi- 
dend incomes accruing  from  the firms  they own. 
As shown in figure 2.3, a productivity  shock opens an employment 
gap OB,  which in our economy is proportional  to the output gap OA10 
Note that the appropriate  measure of output gap in our context is the 
difference  between the amount  of resources  that  could  be produced and 
consumed under flexible  prices (at point A), and the actual  amount  pro- 
duced in the presence  of nominal  rigidities  (at point B). 
Figure 2.3 
Optimal  monetary  policy response  to shocks  under  price  rigidities 76  Corsetti  and Pesenti 
Monetary  policy can be effective in this framework.  Provided  mone- 
tary authorities  are able to observe or predict  Z with accuracy,  and can 
use appropriate  policy instruments  to control  nominal spending, they 
can engineer  a monetary  expansion  to raise |x  and bring  the economy to 
operate  as //"prices  were flexible.  Figure  2.3 shows what happens when 
policymakers  use monetary  instruments  to raise |jl  in proportion  with Z: 
the AD curve shifts up by the amount OA and closes the employment 
and the output gaps. As a result,  the short-run  inflexibility  of prices  does 
not prevent the economy from  operating  at the natural  rate. 
Note that  the monetary  stance  that  brings  employment  and output to 
their  natural  rates  is expansionary  when the economy  experiences  a pro- 
ductivity shock that opens negative employment and output gaps (by 
symmetry,  it will be contractionary  when an adverse  productivity  shock 
leads to overheating  of the economy at unchanged  demand  conditions). 
Intuitively,  thanks  to the productivity  boom firms  are  potentially  able  to 
supply an increased  amount  of consumption  goods. But  if prices  do not 
fall, consumers whose nominal incomes are unchanged are unable to 
purchase these additional products. Hence the need for a monetary 
stimulus,  which generates  additional  aggregate  demand and brings  the 
economy back to potential. By moving in tandem with productivity 
shocks,  monetary  policy stabilizes  the markups  of domestic firms. 
Needless to say,  once we move beyond the boundaries  of our stylized 
framework  and account  for additional  realistic  elements,  there  are  other 
possible policy trade-offs  that make monetary  policy less effective  than 
suggested by the previous analysis. Namely, monetary  policy will not 
target  exactly the flex-price  allocation  in the presence of cost-push and 
sectoral shocks, dual wage and price rigidities, investment dynamics, 
and so forth.  Yet  the main principles  established  in this section remain 
largely valid: for instance, in response to positive supply shocks that 
generate  deflationary  pressure,  it is generally  meaningful  for the policy 
authorities  to provide nominal stimulus to the economy by easing the 
monetary  stance.  We return  to these points in section 2.6. 
2.3  Exchange  Rates and Prices in Open Economies 
We  now extend our analysis  to the study of interdependent,  open econ- 
omies. Relative  to the closed-economy  model analyzed  previously,  there 
are at least two new important  features  to consider. 
First,  firms  sell now in two markets,  both domestically  and abroad.  As 
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raises  important  issues about  firms'  pricing  behavior.  Are  product  prices 
preset in the domestic currency  only? Or rather,  do firms  fix two sets of 
prices,  one for the domestic market  and the other for the export  market 
(provided that product markets are sufficiently segmented so  that 
agents cannot  arbitrage  price differentials)? 
A second difference  is that,  in addition to the macroeconomic  distor- 
tions associated with nominal rigidities and monopoly power in pro- 
duction, there  is now a new distortion  related  to a country's  monopoly 
power on its terms  of trade;  that  is, the relative  price of foreign (traded) 
goods in terms  of domestic (traded)  goods. In fact,  firms  ignore the im- 
pact of their pricing and production  decisions on the country's  overall 
terms of trade. A decentralized equilibrium reflects this inefficiency, 
adding a further  dimension to the policy problem. 
In what follows we build a two-country  general-equilibrium  theoret- 
ical  framework.  This  is the analytical  skeleton  of the medium-  and large- 
scale multi-country  DSGE  models for  policy evaluation  currently  under 
development  at policy institutions  worldwide, such as Global  Economy 
Model (GEM)  at the International  Monetary  Fund, SIGMA  at the Fed- 
eral Reserve  Board  of Governors,  and New Area-wide  Model (NAWM) 
at the European  Central  Bank,  among others.  Our graphical  apparatus 
in the two-country  case is to a large  extent similar  to the one developed 
for closed-economy  analysis.  However,  because  of a number  of features 
specific to open economies, the derivation and interpretation  of the 
equilibrium  schedules need to be modified appropriately. 
2.3.1  Extending  the Basic Model to the World  Economy 
The world economy consists of two countries  of equal size, Home and 
Foreign,  each producing a country-specific  type of good that is traded 
worldwide. Countries  and types of goods are denoted by the letters  H 
and F, respectively.  Similar  to the closed-economy  case, in each country 
monopolistic  competitors  produce  imperfectly  substitutable  varieties  of 
the same  national  good, employing a linear  technology  with labor  as the 
only input in production. 
Households consume both national  and foreign  goods. In both coun- 
tries  the elasticity  of substitution  between different  varieties  of the same 
type of goods (6)  is higher  than  the elasticity  of substitution  between the 
two types of goods H and F, that  we posit equal to one.11 
In terms of notation, we adopt the convention that prices denomi- 
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and households, are  denoted with a star.  So, the Home and Foreign  con- 
sumer  price  indexes are denoted by P and P* respectively,  employment 
levels by € and €*, aggregate consumption levels by C and C*. Home 
consumption  C is a symmetric  basket  of the two country-specific  goods: 
CH  is Home consumption  of the Home good, and CF  is Home consump- 
tion of the Foreign  good. By the same token, C%  is Foreign  consumption 
of local varieties  and C* denotes Foreign  imports  from  the Home coun- 
try.  Similarly,  P is an index of the prices  of the two goods PH  and PF  in the 
Home countries,  and P* is an index of the prices P£ and P  J in the For- 
eign country. 
There  are  three  international  prices.  First,  the nominal  exchange  rate  is 
denoted e, defined as Home currency  per unit of Foreign  currency.  Sec- 
ond, the real  exchange  rate  is defined as the relative  price  of the Foreign 
consumption basket in terms of Home consumption baskets, and is 
therefore  eP*/P. Third,  the terms  of  trade  are  defined as the relative  price 
of Home imports in terms of Home exports, or PF/eP%  Each interna- 
tional  price  is defined in such a way that  its increase  represents  a depre- 
ciation  or deterioration  from the viewpoint of the Home country. 
We denote the country-specific  monetary  stances with |x and |x*,  re- 
spectively.  In each country output is subject  to a country-specific  pro- 
ductivity shock, denoted by Z and Z*. 
Our stylized model has no room for capital  accumulation  and inter- 
national  investment,  thus it has intrinsically  little to say about the main 
driving forces  of current  account  adjustment.  Also, given our emphasis 
on the mechanism  of price adjustment  in response to world shocks,  it is 
meaningful  to opt for simplicity  and to minimize analytical  differences 
with respect  to the closed-economy  case. For  these reasons  we proceed 
by positing from  the start  that  there  is balanced  trade,  so that aggregate 
net exports  are zero in each country: 
PFCF  = eP*C*.  (14) 
A synthesis of the model (except  the equations  determining  prices)  is 
given in table  2.1. It is also illustrated  in figure  2.4,  with the Home coun- 
try on the left and the Foreign  country on the right. As for the closed- 
economy case, the monetary  stance in each country synthesizes the ef- 
fect of monetary  policy on nominal spending. Hence, the AD schedule 
(first  row of table  2.1)  is formally  identical  to the AD in the previous sec- 
tions. However, private spending on consumption now falls on both 
Home and Foreign  goods. As shown by the second and third rows in 
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Table  2.1 
The  open-economy  model 
Home country  Foreign  country 
The  AD block  C = [l/P  C* = \x*/P* 
PHCH=±PC  PfCf=IpC 
p*c*H  = Lp*c*  p*c* = -p*c* 
p = 2P]{2  py2  p* = 2P*i/2  p*i/2 
The  AS  block  C = Z€t  C* = Z*€*t* 
|_2\PH  eP*JJ  L 2 Vf*  Pf)\ 
Exchange  rate  e = - 
JJL* 
Natural  Rate  I = -^  €  *  = -^ 
6k  0k 
domestically  produced  goods and imports,  consistent  with the assump- 
tion of symmetric consumption baskets. Hence, relative to the closed 
economy case, the domestic price level is an equally-weighted  index of 
domestic  and import  prices (fourth  row of table  2.1).12 
The AS schedule (fifth row of table 2.1) is also different from the 
closed-economy case, since it now translates  the supply of domestic 
goods into the consumption  of both  domestic and imported  goods. The 
Home (Foreign)  AS schedule  includes  the new term  t (t*), defined in the 
sixth row of table 2.1. To  understand  this term, observe that at current 
prices it takes 1/t  units of Home output to buy one unit of the Home 
consumption basket C (a symmetric definition applies to the Foreign 
economy). 
Intuitively,  t must then be a function  of the degree of openness of the 
Home economy.  In fact,  in a symmetric  equilibrium  t is equal to 1  /2, the 
size of imports in the Home consumption  basket. Graphically,  the im- 
portant  implication  is that the AS locus is flatter  relative to the closed- 
economy  case (or  t = 1).  Recall  (from  fig. 2.1)  that  in the closed-economy 
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Figure  2.4 
World  economy  model 
curve and the (high) slope of the AS locus, as monopolistic  competition 
creates  a distortion  between marginal  rate of transformation  and mar- 
ginal rate of substitution.  Now, in an open economy (fig. 2.4) the slope 
of the AS locus is lower, and consequently the difference  between the 
two slopes at the equilibrium  point O is smaller.  This  is because  in equi- 
librium  there  are now two  distortions  -  the monopolistic  distortion  and 
the terms  of trade  distortion  -  that  to some extent  offset  each other.  This 
point has important  implications  for the relation  between openness and 
inflationary  bias. We return  to this issue in section  2.5. 
As we discuss in detail in the following, the price of consumption  in 
terms  of output is also a function  of the terms  of trade  between the two 
countries,  defined  previously  as the price  of imports  in terms  of the price 
of exports,  or PF/(eP*).  For  instance,  a lower international  price for the 
Home good worsens the Home terms of trade  and reduces  t, causing a 
downward rotation of the AS schedule. For any level of Home con- 
sumption, Home output and employment must now rise. So, in an 
open-economy  context  the AS can tilt downward either  because  of neg- 
ative productivity  shocks (which are exogenous), or because of relative 
price  movements  worsening the terms  of trade  (which  are  endogenous). 
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rent  and expected future  monetary  developments in the Home country 
relative  to the rest of the world (last row of table  2.1).  This result is a di- 
rect  consequence  of the balanced  trade assumption (14) which, in light 
of the previous spending equations,  can be rewritten  as: 
PC = zP*C*.  (15) 
Accounting  for the AD equations,  we obtain e = |x/|x* in table 2.1.  13  A 
Home monetary  expansion and  /or a Foreign  monetary  tightening de- 
preciate  the Home nominal  exchange  rate.  Similarly,  e appreciates  when 
the monetary  stance of the Home country is contractionary  relative to 
the Foreign  stance. 
As in the closed-economy  model, in the absence  of nominal rigidities 
firms  charge  an optimal fixed markup  over marginal  costs. With  linear 
technologies and constant-elasticity  demand functions, there is no in- 
centive for a firm  to price-discriminate  across  markets:  this implies that 
prices are equalized across countries when expressed in terms of the 
same currency  (i.e.,  the law of one price  holds). Thus,  the four  equations 
determining  the four (flexible)  prices P£ex,  P£ex,  P*flex,  P*flex  are: 
Dflex  =  pp*flex _  ￿￿￿￿  !^_  J^.  {  (\fr\ }  Dflex  H =  pp*flex  H 
_  ￿￿￿￿ 
e - 1 z  {  (\fr\ } 
p*flex =  £f_  = 
UK  »L-  (17) 
Once again, the natural  employment rates NR in both countries  can be 
easily calculated  using these expressions together  with the AD and AS 
equations. 
To  sum up:  the AS is a line through  the origin.  Its  slope includes a term 
reflecting  openness and the level of the terms of trade.  The natural  rate 
locus NR remains  identical  in both the closed- and open-economy  ver- 
sions of our model  -  a property  that will be very useful in carrying  out 
comparative  analysis of our results. The AD is similar to the closed- 
economy case: it draws a horizontal  line in the (€, C) or (€*, C*)  spaces 
depicted  in figure  2.4. However,  in a closed economy PH  and P coincide, 
so that  nominal  rigidities  affecting  the producer  price PH  imply that the 
consumer  price index P is also fixed in the short run. This need not be 
the case in an economy  open to international  trade:  in the Home country, 
the consumer price level P may now adjust in the short run  -  despite 
nominal  rigidities  affecting  the producer  price  PH  -  per effect  of fluctua- 
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2.3.2  Nominal Rigidities and the Pricing  of Exports 
The recent  literature  has revived an important  debate  about  the empiri- 
cal evidence on the response  of prices  to exchange  rate  movements,  pro- 
viding different  possible approaches  to model nominal rigidities in an 
open economy. Empirical  evidence on the elasticity of exchange rate 
pass-through  onto import (export)  prices supports few certainties:  this 
elasticity is smaller over the short-term  than in the long run, it varies 
across sectors and countries,  and is different  for consumer goods and 
wholesale prices (Goldberg and Knetter 1997;  Campa and Goldberg 
2005). 
Considered  as a decision variable  of the exporter,  the determinants  of 
exchange rate pass-through  may clearly include some of the variables 
considered in our model, such as the volatility of monetary and real 
shocks (Taylor  2000;  Corsetti and Pesenti 2002;  Devereux, Engel, and 
Storgaard  2004).  But it may reasonably  depend on many other factors 
outside the scope of our contribution  -  such as the exporter-importer 
working relationship  stressed in the relationship-marketing  literature, 
the presence  of distribution  costs (Corsetti  and Dedola 2005;  Laxton  and 
Pesenti 2003), the market share of exporters  in the local market (Bac- 
chetta  and Van  Wincoop  2005),  or the availability  of financial  strategies 
to limit exposure of exporters' profits to exchange rate fluctuations 
(Friberg  1998). 
Given the scope of our contribution,  we take the degree of pass- 
through as an exogenous factor linked to the invoice currency  in the 
presence  of nominal  rigidities.  In  what follows we discuss three  possible 
specifications  of export  prices consistent  with such an approach. 
Producer  Currency  Pricing (PCP)  In a first  class of models, firms  pre- 
set prices in their own currency  and let prices abroad  move one-to-one 
with the exchange rate (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, 1996 ch.10, 2000; 
Corsetti  and Pesenti 2001).  In other words, PH  and P£ are sticky but PF 
and P£ are  not. Since  export  prices  are  set in the producer's  currency,  the 
literature  often refers  to this case as Producer  Currency  Pricing,  or PCP. 
With  PCP,  firms  optimally  set: 
0k  /ix\  '«=*•«=  en 
0k 
e(£) 
/ix\  (18) 
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Observe  that in this case there is one-to-one pass-through  of exchange 
rate movements onto the price of imports, at both the border and the 
consumer-price  level. As demand elasticities are identical in the two 
countries,  the law of one price holds: once measured in the same cur- 
rency,  goods prices  are the same in all markets. 
Under PCP,  the terms of trade Pf/eP%  are equal to P*e/PH.  Since PH 
and P*  in (18)  and (19)  are preset,  the Home terms  of trade  worsen with 
a nominal  depreciation  of the Home currency  (i.e.,  a higher  e). The  same 
nominal depreciation  of the Home currency  will instead appreciate  the 
Foreign  terms  of trade.  Thus,  when the Home currency  weakens, Home 
goods are cheaper  relative  to Foreign  goods in both the Home and the 
Foreign  country.  As demand shifts in favor  of the goods with the lowest 
relative  price,  world consumption  of Home goods increases  relative  to 
consumption of Foreign goods. These are referred  to as expenditure 
switching effects  of exchange  rate  movements. 
Local  Currency  Pricing (LCP)  According  to a second class of models, 
firms  preset  a price  in domestic  currency  for the domestic  market,  and a 
price  in foreign  currency  for  the export  markets  (Bacchetta  and van Win- 
coop 2000;  Betts  and Devereux  2000;  Chari,  Kehoe,  and McGrattan  2002; 
Duarte and Stockman  2005).  Since export prices are preset in the con- 
sumers'  currency,  the literature  often dubs this case as Local  Currency 
Pricing,  or LCP.  With  LCP  firms  optimally  set: 
0K  /V\  0K  /  |X \ 
6k  /ix*\  6k  /ix*e\ 
Exchange  rate pass-through onto import prices is zero both at the 
border-  and the consumer-price  level. The law of one price is violated 
with any unanticipated  fluctuation  of the exchange  rate:  unless the ex- 
change rate is fixed or perfectly  forecastable,  the consumer  price of the 
Home good in domestic currency  PH  will be different from its export 
price in Home currency  eP£. Analogously, the consumer price of the 
Foreign  good in Foreign currency  P£ will be different from its export 
price  in Foreign  currency  PF/e.14 
Observe  that,  with P* and PF  predetermined  in the short  run, a nomi- 
nal depreciation  of the Home currency improves the Home terms of 
trade  PF/zP%  Correspondingly,  the Foreign  terms  of trade  worsen. The 
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direction relative to the PCP case. Since prices are preset in local cur- 
rency,  exchange  rate  fluctuations  do not affect  the relative  price  faced  by 
importers  and consumers.  There is no expenditure  switching effect of 
exchange  rate  movements. 
Dollar Pricing (DP)  While the literature  has mainly focused on the 
previous two polar cases, there is also a third possibility (probably  the 
most relevant  one from  an empirical  viewpoint):  the world export  prices 
are set in one vehicle currency  only, for example,  in the Home country's 
currency.  Home firms preset all prices in their own currency;  Foreign 
firms preset export prices in the Home currency  (Corsetti  and Pesenti 
2005a;  Devereux,  Engel,  and Tille  2003;  Devereux,  Shi, and Xu 2007).  In 
this case  -  that  we dub dollar  pricing  or DP  -  we have: 
p«  =  eP«  = 
i^TE(z)  (22) 
0k  /u*\  8k  /ix*e\ 
In the DP case the law of one price only holds for the Home country 
products. Exchange  rate pass-through  is asymmetric:  it is zero in the 
Home country,  but complete in the Foreign  country.  Thus, a Home de- 
preciation  does not affect  the price of imports  in the Home country,  but 
lowers the price of imports in the Foreign  country.  Interestingly,  how- 
ever, the benefits of lower prices and higher purchasing  power for the 
Foreign country consumers are offset by the profit losses of Foreign 
firms and shareholders.  In fact, Foreign  firms that export to the Home 
country sell their products at the price PF  -  which is fixed in the short 
run  -  but repatriate  their export sales revenue at the rate 1/e -  which 
falls with the Home currency  depreciation. 
Export  Pricing and the Natural  Rate  We  conclude this section  by not- 
ing an important  property  of the model. Independent  of which pricing 
specification  is selected among the three possibilities described  previ- 
ously,  expected  employment  is always equal to its natural  rate  -  exactly 
as in the closed economy.  As a straightforward  implication  of the equa- 
tions presented  previously,  we have in fact: 
E(i) = £(€*) = 
^-  (24) 
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2.4  International  Macroeconomic  Transmission 
In this section we  study the international transmission of country- 
specific productivity shocks. Similar to the closed-economy case, we 
start  by considering  the allocation  with flexible  prices,  which provides a 
benchmark  to guide our policy analysis.  Next, we study the equilibrium 
allocation  and international  spillovers  when policymakers  react  to shocks 
by pursuing  policies that  stabilize  output and employment at their  nat- 
ural  rate  -  the policy conduct that,  as we saw before,  is able to replicate 
the flex-price  allocation  in a closed economy. 
2.4.1  Domestic and Foreign  Effects  of Productivity Shocks  under 
Flexible Prices 
Figure  2.5 illustrates  the macroeconomic  response to a positive produc- 
tivity  shock  in the Home country,  assuming  that  prices  are  perfectly  flex- 
ible. On impact,  a positive shock to Z rotates  the AS schedule upward. 
We have seen that the natural rate of employment is independent of 
productivity  shocks. Hence, in an equilibrium  without price rigidities, 
higher productivity  raises consumption along the NR locus. Different 
from the closed economy case, however, the higher supply of Home 
Figure 2.5 
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goods lowers their international  price:  the terms of trade  move against 
the Home country.15 
The fall in t, that  reflects  worsening terms  of trade,  tilts the AS sched- 
ule downward,  partially  offsetting  the upward rotation  of the AS due to 
a positive Z shock. In other  words, relative  to the closed-economy  case, 
a shock to Z makes the AS rotate  by less. For  any given Home monetary 
stance, |x the domestic marginal  cost and the price of Home goods PH 
both fall one-to-one with the productivity increase.  The Home CPI P 
also falls,  although  by less than  PH  as part  of Home consumption  falls on 
imported  Foreign  goods. Hence the AD shifts upwards,  but not as far  as 
it would in a closed economy.  The equilibrium  moves from point O to 
point H. 
Part  of the gains from  higher  productivity  in the Home country  accrue 
to consumers  abroad.  The fall in the international  price of Home goods 
raises  Foreign  incomes  in real  terms.  Because  of lower import  prices,  the 
Foreign  terms  of trade  are stronger,  raising  t*: the AS* rotates  upward. 
Lower  import  prices  also lower the Foreign  CPI  P*,  raising  consumption 
demand along with the AD* schedule. The equilibrium  in the Foreign 
country moves from point O* to point H*. Overall,  Foreign  consump- 
tion increases  while employment  remains  at its natural  level. This is an 
unambiguous  welfare gain for the Foreign  economy.  The international 
transmission  of productivity  shocks is clearly  positive. 
2.4.2  Productivity Shocks  in Open  Economies  with Nominal 
Rigidities 
In the presence of nominal rigidities, the macroeconomic  impact of 
country-specific productivity shocks is sharply different. An unex- 
pected increase  in Home productivity does not move the nominal ex- 
change rate,  which only responds  to monetary  factors.  Hence the shock 
has no impact on import prices, which are either sticky (as in the LCP 
case) or move with the exchange rate (as in the PCP case). With no 
changes in prices and the CPI, aggregate demand is constant in real 
terms in both countries.  Higher domestic productivity  at Home there- 
fore translates  into a lower level of domestic  employment  -  precisely  as 
in the closed-economy  case.  Without  changes  in the exchange  rate,  there 
are no consequences  for the Foreign  economy. 
The  previous point can  be restated  in graphical  terms,  as in figure  2.6: 
other  things  equal,  a positive shock  to Home productivity  rotates  the AS 
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Figure 2.6 
International  nontransmission  of productivity  shocks  under  price  rigidities 
from  point O to point B.  Consumption  is not affected,  economic  activity 
is too low  -  exactly as in the sticky-price  equilibrium  of figure 2.2. The 
Foreign  economy remains  completely  unchanged  at point O*. 
Note that this result holds regardless  of the specification  of nominal 
rigidities  in the export  markets  (i.e.,  PCP  or LCP  or DP).  In all cases,  pro- 
ductivity  shocks  have no direct  effects  on prices  and exchange  rates.  But 
as for the closed economy, shocks that translate  into undesirable  em- 
ployment  fluctuations,  and open employment  and output gaps, invite a 
monetary  policy response.  Thus,  productivity  shocks  may have an indi- 
rect  effects  on prices,  via changes  in the monetary  stance  aimed at stabi- 
lizing the macroeconomy. 
2.4.3  Stabilization Properties  of the Exchange  Rate (the PCP Model) 
In our analysis of the closed economy we have seen that, when mone- 
tary authorities  react  to productivity  shocks by closing the output gap 
completely,  the market  equilibrium  coincides  with the flex-price  alloca- 
tion. Is monetary  policy equally effective  in our open-economy  setting? 
To answer this question we need to focus on the role of exchange rate 
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The  conventional  wisdom exemplified  by the enduring  contributions 
of Friedman  1953  and Mundell 1963  suggests that,  in a world with nom- 
inal price rigidities,  exchange  rate  movements facilitate  the efficient  ad- 
justment  of international  relative  prices.  With  flexible  prices,  the relative 
price of Home goods falls in response to a positive productivity  shock. 
With  sticky  prices,  adjustment  can  be achieved  via an exchange  rate  de- 
preciation  (corresponding  to Home monetary  expansion  relative  to For- 
eign), which lowers the international  price of the Home goods relative 
to Foreign  goods. 
To  revisit the theoretical  foundations  of the conventional  wisdom, we 
can reconsider our open-economy model under PCP (the first of the 
three export-pricing  specifications  discussed previously). We focus on 
the following scenario.  There  is an unexpected,  positive increase  in pro- 
ductivity in the Home country.  Home monetary policymakers  are as- 
sumed to adopt an inward-looking  policy rule, and set the monetary 
stance to close the domestic output gap opened by productivity  fluctu- 
ations. Foreign  monetary  policymakers  maintain  a constant  monetary 
stance.  This  scenario  provides a useful baseline  for  our  analysis  of the in- 
ternational  transmission  mechanism. Note that we have said nothing 
about the optimality of the policy responses described  previously:  we 
take these monetary conducts as given and analyze their macroeco- 
nomic properties.  Later,  we discuss whether  or not these policies can  be 
rationalized  as welfare-maximizing. 
The experiment  is illustrated  in figure 2.7. The positive productivity 
shock at Home rotates  the AS upward,  but when the monetary  authori- 
ties respond to the shock by loosening the monetary stance, the ex- 
change rate  depreciates  and the terms  of trade  fall, lowering  t: a drop in 
t offsets in part the rotation  of the AS due to Z. At the same time, looser 
monetary conditions (a higher |x) shift the AD upward, but less than 
one-to-one.  This is because,  to the extent  that  import  prices  rise with ex- 
change rate depreciation,  the country experiences some CPI inflation. 
The Home economy moves from O to H along the NR schedule. 
The exchange rate depreciation  in the Home country improves the 
terms of trade abroad:  a higher t* tilts the AS* upward. Note that the 
AS* rotation  does not reflect  any improvement  in Foreign  productivity 
(Z* remains constant).  Lower import prices translate  into a fall of the 
Foreign  CPI.  For  a given Foreign  monetary  stance |x*,  a fall in the price 
level raises  demand, shifting the AD curve upwards. The Foreign  econ- 
omy moves from  point O* to point H* along the NR* schedule, mirror- 
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Figure 2.7 
Stabilization policy under high pass-through  (PCP) 
eign households enjoy a higher  level of consumption  for an unchanged 
level of labor  effort.  The international  transmission  of Home shocks is 
unambiguously  positive. 
Three  points are worth emphasizing. First,  in a PCP world it is pos- 
sible to undo the effects  of nominal  rigidities  and replicate  the flex-price 
allocation  by following exactly  the same policy prescription  considered 
in the closed-economy  case (|x moves one-to-one  with Z). A policy that 
targets  domestic price stability,  and closes the Home employment gap, 
raises  consumption  at Home and abroad  in proportion  to productivity. 
Given that  employment  remains  constant  in equilibrium,  higher Home 
productivity  Z means a higher  world supply of Home goods. In an effi- 
cient allocation,  their  world prices  must drop. 
Second,  observe  that  with nominal  prices  sticky  in domestic  currency, 
it is the exchange rate that induces the efficient adjustment  in relative 
prices,  redirecting  world demand towards the more abundant  product. 
Thus, under PCP exchange rate movements are stabilizing and ex- 
change  rate  flexibility  is desirable.16 
Third,  we should note, however, that since the exchange  rate  is equal 
to the relative  monetary  stance, the right price adjustment  through the 
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the equilibrium  of figure 2.5 is exactly similar  to the equilibrium  of fig- 
ure 2.7 (points  H and H* are  the same in the two figures),  the adjustment 
mechanisms  are different.  In the flex-price  case of figure  2.5 adjustment 
is automatic.  Under  price  stickiness  as in figure  2.7,  efficient  adjustment 
requires a specific and deliberate course of action by the monetary 
policymakers. 
2.4.4  Market  Segmentation  and Imperfect  Pass-through  (the 
LCP  Model) 
According  to the conventional  view, exchange  rate  movements modify 
the relative  price of domestic and imported  goods. However,  empirical 
studies and casual observation suggest that, in practice,  the prices of 
most imported goods at the consumer level are rather  inelastic to ex- 
change rate movements (Engel 1999;  Engel and Rogers 1996;  Goldberg 
and Knetter  1997;  Parsley and Wei 2001;  Rogoff 1996).  Then, exchange 
rate  movements may not induce the expenditure-switching  effects that 
the conventional  view places at the heart  of the transmission  mechanism 
(Engel  2002). 
Consider  our model under the assumption  that firms  preset prices  in 
domestic currency  for the national  market,  and in foreign currency  for 
the export market (the LCP  case discussed previously). With nominal 
rigidities,  all prices  in the world economy are  now fixed in the short  run 
regardless of currency fluctuations. In contrast to the PCP case, ex- 
change rate movements neither affect the price of the Home goods 
abroad,  nor redirect  world demand towards them. The crucial  effect of 
exchange rate movements in this economy is on firms' markups and 
profits.  Since the Foreign-currency  price of the Home goods is preset,  a 
depreciation  of the Home exchange  rate  raises the revenue in domestic 
currency  of each unit of product sold abroad:  hence the markup  over 
marginal  costs increases  with depreciation.  But  this means that  nominal 
depreciation improves  -  instead of worsening  -  the Home terms of 
trade PF/eP*H. 
Let  us reconsider  the equilibrium  effects  of a productivity  shock  when 
Home monetary  authorities  stabilize the output gap in the new frame- 
work (fig. 2.8).  As in the PCP  case, a positive productivity  shock rotates 
the AS upward, and a Home monetary  expansion  raises  Home nominal 
spending. However,  its macroeconomic  effects  differ  from  the PCP  case 
in two important  respects.  First,  raising |x  now has a much stronger  im- 
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short  run.  Even  if the exchange  rate  depreciates,  there  is no imported  in- 
flation.  The  AD shifts  one-to-one  with |x  (as in the closed economy case). 
Second,  the Home depreciation  improves  the terms  of trade:  t rises with 
the exchange  rate  and the AS rotates  upwards even further,  reinforcing 
the initial  impact  of the productivity  shock. 
The Home economy moves from  point O to point L.  In the new equi- 
librium,  employment  is at its natural  rate (this is by construction,  given 
our assumption about Home monetary policy), but stronger terms of 
trade allow domestic households to increase  their consumption much 
more than  in the PCP  case. For  any given shock to Z, the segment O L  in 
figure  2.8 is larger  than the segment O H in figure  2.7. The economy op- 
erates  away from its flex-price  benchmark  allocation,  delivering  higher 
utility to domestic  households. 
The  extra  gains for  the Home economy come at the expense of the For- 
eign country.  Home expansions  have no effect  on Foreign  consumption. 
Foreign  consumer  prices are preset in Foreign  currency  and are there- 
fore inelastic  to exchange  rate  movements in the short run:  the Foreign 
AD* schedule does not move. Conversely,  the Foreign terms of trade 
now worsen with the Home currency depreciation.  The AS* rotates 
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to work more to sustain the same level of consumption.  A higher level 
of effort at an unchanged level of consumption  unambiguously  worsens 
Foreign households'  welfare.  The international  transmission  of policy 
shock is clearly negative,  that is, "beggar thy neighbor." 
To sum up, the main predictions  of the LCP model  are quite distant 
from the PCP case. The sign of policy transmission is different: positive 
in the PCP case, negative  in the LCP case. Also  far apart are the re- 
sponses  of international prices: in a world  with PCP, monetary expan- 
sions worsen  the terms of trade; they improve it in the LCP case. In the 
PCP case, exchange  rate movements  affect relative  prices for a given 
consumption  level,  switching  demand  across  different  categories  of 
goods. In the LCP case, there is no expenditure-switching  effect from ex- 
change rate movements.  If anything, what is switched  is the labor bur- 
den to sustain world consumption. 
2A.5  A Case of Asymmetric  Transmission (the DP Model) 
Transmission in an economy  where all export prices are set in one cur- 
rency (the DP case) somewhat  combines the two cases discussed  previ- 
ously. The crucial feature of such an economy  is that different mecha- 
nisms  mute the responses  of t and t* to shocks. In the Home  country, 
consumer prices do not respond to the exchange rate, while dollar pric- 
ing insulate exporters' markups from exchange rate movements.  In the 
Foreign country, the positive  effects of lower import prices are offset by 
a fall in profits from exports: the local-currency value of export sales fall 
with the Home depreciation. 
We can visualize  these effects in figure 2.9. Once again, the shock to Z 
tilts the AS upward and prompts an increase in |jl  to close the output gap. 
In the Home country, where all prices are preset in Home currency, the 
monetary expansion  raises domestic  demand  one-to-one.  The ensuing 
Home depreciation has no implications for the profits of domestic firms, 
since  pass-through  of  exchange  rate movements  onto  Home  export 
prices is complete. Consumption  rises above the natural rate, while em- 
ployment  remains at the natural rate. The Home economy  moves  from 
O to D, where the length of the segment O D lies somewhere  between  O 
H in figure 2.7 and O L in figure 2.8. 
In the Foreign country, Home  depreciation  translates into lower im- 
port prices,  hence  into  a lower  CPI. For a given  domestic  monetary 
stance, the AD* shifts upward. But since there is no effect on the relative 
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Foreign  economy  moves from  point O*  to point D* along the unchanged 
AS* schedule. Thus, in the new equilibrium  Foreign  households enjoy 
higher  consumption  (actually,  as high as in the PCP  case:  the gain in For- 
eign consumption O*H*  in figure 2.9 is equal to the segment O*H*  in 
figure  2.7),  but also work more. In other  words, the international  trans- 
mission  is positive as regards  consumption,  negative  as regards  labor  ef- 
fort.  However,  to the extent that  monopolistic  distortions  in production 
are  more  relevant  than  the terms  of trade  distortion,  the first  component 
dominates  and the international  transmission  is overall  positive. In this 
case, in fact,  the indifference  curve in the preshock  equilibrium  cuts the 
AS*  from  above.  Hence,  a small  movement  along the AS*  raises  welfare. 
Note that,  from  the point of view of Foreign  consumers,  the exchange 
rate  plays a stabilizing  role in the product market:  Home currency  de- 
preciations  lower the price of Home goods. The sign of the adjustment 
is consistent with the flex-price  benchmark.  But the negative implica- 
tions of exchange rate movements on Foreign  firms'  profits are clearly 
destabilizing.  Vis-a-vis  the received  wisdom on international  transmis- 
sion (corresponding  to the PCP  case) and its strongest  critique  (the LCP 
case), the case of dollar  pricing  stresses the realistic  possibility of coun- 
teracting  effects  from  exchange  rate  movements  within an economy. 
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noticing  that  the Home economy is fully insulated  from  external  shocks: 
for any given |x  and Z, exchange  rate  shocks  or cyclical  developments  in 
the Foreign country have no macroeconomic  effects on output, con- 
sumption, and terms of trade in the Home country. In other words, 
when Home policymakers  respond to local productivity shocks there 
are  repercussions  in the rest  of the world (as illustrated  in figure  2.9),  but 
when Foreign  policymakers  react  to local shocks there  are  no spillovers 
to the Home country economy. This asymmetry stems from the pre- 
dominant role in global trade of the vehicle currency issued by the 
Home country. 
2.5  Globalization and Inflationary  Bias 
2.5.1  Monetary  Discretion in the Closed-Economy  Case 
In the previous sections, monetary policy has been characterized  in 
terms  of ad hoc, arbitrary  rules (such  as the Home country  targeting  full 
employment  and the Foreign  country  maintaining  a passive stance).  The 
remainder  of the paper  is devoted to an intuitive  explanation  of optimal 
policies in closed and open economies. 
As a starting  point, an important  result of our section on monetary 
policy in a closed economy is that policymakers  informed about the 
state of the economy Z could use monetary  instruments  to move aggre- 
gate demand  C  toward  its flex-price  level for  a given price  level P. Would 
such a policy conduct  be optimal? 
To  perform  such an exercise,  we need to specify a welfare metric:  in 
our model, it is natural  to assume that  the objective  function  of the poli- 
cymakers  coincides  with the utility of the national  representative  agent, 
visualized graphically  in terms  of our map of indifference  curves.  In fig- 
ure 2.10  we return  to the closed-economy  model we introduced  in figure 
2.1.  The  economy is in equilibrium  at point O,  where actual  employment 
is at its natural  rate.  The  problem  with such allocation  is that  monopoly 
distortions result in a socially suboptimal level of welfare:  in equilib- 
rium the indifference  curve cuts the AS curve from above. Once prices 
are  set, ex-post  utility could be increased  through  a monetary  expansion 
that moves the equilibrium  to the right of €, up to the point X at which 
the indifference  curve is tangent  to the AS locus. 
To shed light on this point, consider what policymakers  would do if 
they optimized their monetary stance in a discretionary  manner once 
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the utility of the representative  household (i.e., solves the following 
problem): 
max U = In C -  k€ = In £ 
-  k€.  (25) 
n  P 
The monetary  authorities  take prices as given,  independent of their de- 
cisions.  Accounting  for (3) and (4),  the first  order  condition  of the above 
problem  is: 
£-7 
(26) 
according to whether the optimal monetary policy under discretion 
pushes labor  effort (. (the left-hand  side of 26) towards its competitive 
level (the right-hand  side of 26) equal to 1/k. 
In our setting there is, however, a crucial  problem in solving for an 
equilibrium  with discretionary  monetary  policy.  Using (26)  to solve for 
P in (10),  we obtain: 
This condition  cannot  be part of a rational-expectations  equilibrium.  In 
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when 6/(6 - 1) = 1 (i.e., for 6 -> °°).  Otherwise,  whatever the price level 
chosen  by the firms,  there  is always an incentive  for the policymakers  to 
expand the monetary  stance  above private  expectations  and, in terms  of 
figure  2.10,  manipulate  private  agents'  real  incomes to increase  employ- 
ment and consumption  at X. 
To derive a model where a rational-expectations  equilibrium  exists, 
one could modify our specification above by accounting for welfare 
costs from realized inflation in (25).18  This approach leads to models 
in the tradition  of the Kydland-Prescott  1977  and Barro-Gordon  1983a, 
1983b analysis of inflationary  bias. Alternatively,  some contributions 
to the literature  analyze monetary policy in economies where distor- 
tionary (Pigouvian) tax and subsidies can eliminate the distortions 
caused by monopoly power, hence making the optimal policy time- 
consistent. 
Suppose in fact that the government  can subsidize firms'  production 
at the rate  (1  - Q"1,  with C,  = 1  /6, raising  tax revenue  in a lump-sum  fash- 
ion. Then,  firms'  optimality  will ensure  that  prices  are  equal to expected 
marginal  costs: 
6  fw\  /kll\ 
"-F-r<i-?)E(y)-£(T) 
6  fw\  /kll\  <*> 
Under these conditions, a monetary stance |x that moves one-to-one 
with shocks  Z is the optimal  monetary  policy under  discretion  \kdis  as de- 
rived in (26).  In equilibrium  there  is no longer any incentive  for the pol- 
icymakers  to deviate from the optimal  policy: 
^  A  «-«#)=#) 
(29) 
The economy operates  at an efficient  (first-best)  natural  rate  of employ- 
ment,  equal  to the competitive  level 1  / k,  such that  the indifference  curve 
in our graph is tangent  to the AS curve in equilibrium. 
The intuition  underlying  this result  is straightforward.  There  are two 
distortions  in our closed economy:  nominal  price  rigidities  and monop- 
oly power in production. The government needs at least two instru- 
ments to achieve efficiency:  on the demand side of the economy,  mone- 
tary  policy eliminates  the negative consequences  of fixed prices;  on the 
supply side of the economy, fiscal policy eliminates distortions  due to 
monopolistic competition.  The appropriate  monetary  and fiscal stance 
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2.5.2  Inflationary  versus  Deflationary  Bias in Open  Economies 
How does economic  globalization  affect  the previous analysis?  A large 
literature  has focused on the relationship  between openness and infla- 
tion,  providing  evidence that  more  open economies  are  characterized  by 
lower average  inflation  rates  in a large  cross-section  of countries  (Romer 
1993;  Lane  1997).  We  can revisit  this point in terms  of our apparatus.  As 
for the closed-economy  case, the optimal policy in an open economy is 
not, in general, time-consistent.  However, each country faces now the 
additional distortion related to its monopoly power on the terms of 
trade.  Terms  of trade  considerations  may actually  mitigate  and possibly 
offset the inflationary  bias described  previously. 
Under discretion  Home policymakers  maximize agents'  current  util- 
ity with respect  to |x after  observing  the shocks Z and Z*, taking firms' 
prices as well as Foreign  policy as given. Foreign  policymakers  solve a 
similar  problem.  In the PCP  model, the welfare-maximizing  monetary 
stances  under discretion  are: 
z"2e-iV/  z*  2 e-i  \z*/ 
The above conditions cannot  be part of a rational  expectations  equilib- 
rium,  except in the special  case in which 1/0 = 2.19  We  have seen that  in 
a closed economy,  monopolistic  distortions  in production  create  an in- 
centive for the policymakers  to expand demand and bring output to its 
competitive level 1/k. This need not be true in an open economy.  The 
above expressions make clear that policymakers  have an incentive to 
either expand or contract  aggregate  demand (given prices) depending 
on whether  the import  share  in consumption  (equal  to 1  /2 in our speci- 
fication)  is above or below the reciprocal  of the markup  (6 - 1)/9. 
In  terms  of figure  2.10,  openness  reduces  (other  things  equal)  the slope 
of the AS locus. Thus, the slope of the indifference  curve at the equilib- 
rium point O can be lower (as in the closed economy case), equal to, or 
possibly higher than the slope of the equilibrium  AS. 
Intuitively,  recall  that  in an open economy monopolistic  distortions  in 
production coexist with terms of trade distortions,  whose magnitude 
depends  -  among other  things  -  on the degree of openness of the econ- 
omy. Under discretion,  welfare-maximizing  policymakers  expand ag- 
gregate  demand if the former  distortions  are sufficiently  important  rel- 
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high (6 < 2 in our specification),  policymakers  are less concerned  with 
adverse import  price movements due to an exchange  rate  depreciation 
than with the inefficient  level of domestic output. By the same token,  in 
economies that are relatively  closed to trade, the exchange rate affects 
the price of a relatively  small share of consumption  goods. Also in this 
case, benevolent policymakers  have an incentive to raise output above 
market  equilibrium. 
The reverse is true when monopolistic distortions  in production  are 
relatively  low (6 > 2), or the economy is sufficiently  open. In the latter 
case, while raising output and employment, a monetary expansion 
would also increase  the price  of a substantial  proportion  of consumption 
goods. When terms of trade  movements  become the dominant  concern 
in discretionary  policy making,  monetary  authorities  actually  prefer  to 
engineer  surprise  revaluations  as a way to improve  the relative  prices  of 
their  country's  output.20 
We  close this section  with an important  caveat:  openness in itself  need 
not guarantee a lower inflationary  bias. Exchange rate pass-through 
considerations  also matter.  In fact, moving away from the PCP model 
and reducing  the degree of pass-through  would clearly  blunt the terms 
of trade  effects of monetary  policy.  To  show this, consider  the LCP  case 
previously introduced.  When  pass-through  is low worldwide, the solu- 
tions to the policy problems  under discretion  are: 
z  "e-ih\  z f  z* "e-i^z*/  (31) 
In this case, discretionary  policy is unambiguously  biased towards  sur- 
prise  monetary  expansions,  even more  so than  in the  closed-economy  case! 
2.6  Optimal Monetary  Policy under Commitment 
2.6.1  The  Closed-Economy  Case  Revisited 
In section 2.5 policymakers  were unable to commit to a credible  mone- 
tary  policy.  In  this section  we are  interested  instead  in the optimal  design 
of monetary  rules,  accounting  for the fact  that  forward-looking  firms  set 
the prices of their  products  on the basis of their  expectations  about  both 
economic  fundamentals  and policy variables.  Is it still true  that  the opti- 
mal policy stance does stabilize producers'  markups?  And what hap- 
pens when both domestic and foreign firms supply products to local 
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To  address these questions,  we start  by respecifying  the appropriate 
welfare metric.  In our model, it is natural  to assume that the objective 
function  of the policymakers,  here denoted by °W,  coincides  with the ex- 
pected  utility of the national  representative  agent: 
W = E(U) = E(]nC-Ke).  (32) 
As before,  the welfare-maximizing  stance  is contingent  to the realization 
of the shocks.  Different  from  before,  it is determined  taking  into account 
that private expectations (and prices) are affected by the specific fea- 
tures  of the policy rule itself. 
Let  us reconsider  the closed-economy  case, and recall  that  in a market 
equilibrium  expected employment is constant and equal to its natural 
rate,  according  to (12).  Thus,  using the equilibrium  expression  for opti- 
mal preset  prices (10),  the welfare  criterion  simplifies  to: 
W = £(ln £) -  k€ = £(ln \l) -  In e( 
^  ) 
+ constant.  (33) 
Maximizing  the above expression  with respect  to |x  yields: 
I-  !£--  0  (34) 
|x  E(\l/Z) 
solved by a policy (x  that moves one-to-one with productivity shocks 
Z, say: 
jjl =  olZ  (35) 
where a is an arbitrary  positive parameter  that firms know when they 
set their  prices.21 
The previous condition characterizes  the optimal monetary policy 
stance  up to the scale of nominal  variables  in the economy.  The optimal 
policy consists of a commitment  to provide a nominal anchor for the 
economy, a, and to deviate from such stance only when productivity 
shocks in the economy threaten  to destabilize  marginal  costs and move 
employment  and output away from  their  potential  levels. In our frame- 
work, by responding fully and systematically  to Z, such policy com- 
pletely eliminates uncertainty  in marginal costs, and thus in profits. 
Prices  are stabilized  at the level P = aK0/(0 - 1).22 
If monetary authorities deliver the optimal monetary stance (35), 
nominal rigidities are inconsequential,  in the sense that policymakers 
can stimulate  aggregate  demand to close the output gap and push the 
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In terms  of figure  2.3, any stochastic  rotation  of the AS locus is perfectly 
matched  by a corresponding  shift in the AD locus, so that in the short 
run the equilibrium  always lies along the NR vertical  line above the nat- 
ural rate.  Note that, under optimal monetary  policy, consumption  will 
not be constant  but rather  fluctuate  with productivity,  perfectly  match- 
ing the flexible-price  allocation. 
2.6.2  High  Markups  and Low Purchasing  Power as the Outcomes  of 
Insufficient  Stabilization 
Having established  what optimal  policy means in the framework  of our 
model, we can now turn our attention  to a different  issue: what are the 
consequences  of adopting a suboptimal  monetary  policy not aimed at 
full stabilization?  We will show that insufficient  stabilization  translates 
into suboptimally high markups and price levels  -  making a case for 
price stability  in the design of optimal  stabilization  policies. 
To  provide a graphical  treatment,  without loss of generality  consider 
an economy where Z is a random variable that can rise or fall by the 
same amount  with equal probability  1/2, with E(Z)  = 1. Figure  2.11  de- 
picts the two possible AS lines, corresponding  to a high and a low level 
of Z. They intersect  the NR locus at points A and A'  , respectively.  Ob- 
serve that,  were the optimal  policy (35)  in place, employment  would be 
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constant  at its natural  level (,, and consumption  would be high or low 
depending on the realization of the productivity shock. For conven- 
ience, we draw the AS line corresponding  to the average productivity 
level, £(Z) = 1,  which intersects  the NR locus at point O,  with AO = O'A. 
The BOB'  AD line that goes through  O corresponds  to the average  con- 
sumption  level in the flex-price  allocation.  In the graph,  we also draw a 
second AD locus below the first  one, the FQF'  line whose interpretation 
will be made clear  shortly. 
We  are  interested  in studying the equilibrium  allocation  when policy- 
making deviates from the optimal monetary  stance. For instance,  sup- 
pose that  monetary  authorities  set the current  stance  according  to a pas- 
sive rule: 
|x = a.  (36) 
In other  words, |ljl  does not respond at all to the output gap. With  sticky 
prices,  consumption  will then be constant  but employment  will be fluc- 
tuating  with Z:  it will be below the natural  rate  when the shock is posi- 
tive, above the natural  rate  when the shock is negative. 
These  points are  illustrated  in figure  2.11.  Consider  the upper  AD line, 
drawn for the price level PB  at a level of consumption  equal to average 
consumption in a flex price equilibrium.  If prices are predetermined, 
and monetary  policy is passive, the economy will operate  either at B or 
at B'  . The  same is true  for  the lower AD locus, corresponding  to a higher 
price level PF  > PB,  thus intersecting  the NR locus at the point Q below 
the point O:  when P = PF  the economy operates  either  at F or at F\ 
Now, it is easy to see that  average  consumption  under a passive mon- 
etary policy must be lower than the level that would prevail in a fully 
stabilized economy. In other words, the preset price PB  cannot be an 
equilibrium.  To  see why, recall  that firms  optimally  preset prices to en- 
sure  that,  on  average,  they operate  on their  supply schedule.  As discussed 
previously,  an important  implication  of such behavior is that expected 
employment  is equal to its natural  rate.  But figure 2.11  clearly  suggests 
that this condition  is violated when P = PB. 
In fact, consider the two possible equilibria  on the upper AD line. 
When the productivity  shock is positive, employment falls by the seg- 
ment BO. But when the shock is negative, employment increases  by a 
larger  amount,  equal  to the segment OB  ' >BO. Taking  the average  of the 
two employment levels with equal probability,  it follows that at PB  the 
expected employment gap is positive; that is, expected employment is 
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E(€)|p=Pa>€.  (37) 
In other words, at PB  each firm is supplying  too much relative to the level 
of output that maximizes  its expected discounted  profits. Each firm has 
therefore an incentive  to cut back on its production  plans,  raising its 
price: hence, PB  cannot be the equilibrium price level.23 
Given the distribution  of Z, equilibrium  pricing always  equates  the 
average gap between employment  and its natural rate to zero. In our ex- 
ample this principle has a simple  geometrical interpretation: given  the 
two  AS curves  corresponding  to the two  different realizations  of the 
productivity process, and holding  |x constant, prices (and the AD sched- 
ule) must be set such that the low and high employment  allocations are 
perfectly symmetric around €. In figure 2.11, this happens in correspon- 
dence to the lower AD curve, based on the higher price index PF.  In this 
case, when  the productivity  shock is positive  employment  falls by the 
segment FQ, and when  the shock is negative  employment  increases by 
the segment  QF'  , where FQ = QF'. 
Figure 2.11 sheds light on one of the key reasons why insufficient sta- 
bilization  can reduce national welfare. Facing uncertainty in marginal 
costs,  firms raise their average  markups  and charge higher prices for 
their products.  As a result, households'  purchasing  power  is subopti- 
mally low: failure to stabilize the economy does not affect expected disu- 
tility from labor effort (which is kept constant by firms' optimal pricing), 
but does reduce utility from consumption. 
Observe that, for any given  suboptimal  monetary policy, the higher 
the variance of the shock (the further away  are the two AS lines from 
each other in figure 2.11), the higher the equilibrium price level (thus, the 
lower the equilibrium AD). It follows  that, for a given monetary stance, 
changes in the variance of the shocks from one period to another lead to 
adjustment in prices, creating temporary fluctuations of inflation.24 
2.6.3  Optimal Policy  in Open Economies and the Gains from 
International  Coordination 
Do optimal  stabilization  rules in an open  economy  deviate  from their 
counterparts in closed economy? How do openness  and trade affect the 
design  and conduct  of monetary  policy? In this section we  take a first 
pass at these issues  by studying  optimal  policies  for each of the three 
specifications of export pricing (i.e., PCP,  LCP,  and DP). We discuss both 
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dently of each other,  and the case in which they do so in a cooperative 
way (Ball  1999;  Benigno  2002;  Canzoneri,  Cumby,  and Diba 2005;  Clar- 
ida, Gali, and Gertler  2002;  Corsetti  and Pesenti 2005a;  Gali and Mona- 
celli 2005; Lombardo  and Sutherland  2004; Monacelli 2005; Obstfeld 
2002;  Sutherland  2005;  Svensson 2000). 
In the absence  of international  coordination,  Home policymakers  de- 
termine  their  welfare-optimizing  monetary  stance  by maximizing  °W  as 
defined  in (32)  with respect  to |x,  while taking  the monetary  policy in the 
other country |x*  as given. Similarly,  Foreign  authorities  maximize W* 
with respect to |x* given jx.  We denote the monetary stances indepen- 
dently chosen by the two authorities  with |xNash  and |x^ash  as shorthand 
for  Nash equilibrium.  Instead,  in a cooperative  equilibrium,  national  au- 
thorities jointly maximize a weighted average of Home and Foreign 
welfare 0.5°^ + 0.5°lf  *, whereas the weights coincide with the share of 
each country  in world consumption.  The cooperative  monetary  stances 
are denoted ^Coop  and \x*c  oop. 
The PCP  Model  Our model with PCP  provides an example in which 
the optimal  policy in open economy is identical  to the optimal  policy in 
closed economy: domestic policymakers  focus exclusively on the do- 
mestic  output  gap, offsetting  any fluctuation  in employment  and output 
around  their  natural  level. 
In  the context  of a noncooperative  equilibrium,  using the pricing  equi- 
librium  expressions  with PCP,  the policy problem  in the Home country 
can be written  as 
maxE[lnC-K€]  (38) 
= max Eln|jL  + -E  In ^l*  -  -In  £(-£  -  -|lnE|-^-)  + constant . 
i  L 
Eln|jL  2  2  \Z  2)  \Z*J  J 
The  optimal  monetary  policy satisfies  |x^h = aZ, precisely  the same ex- 
pression  as in the closed economy (Clarida,  Gali,  and Gertler  2001).  The 
optimal  policy is completely  inward looking, in the sense that it is only 
concerned  with stabilizing  domestic  markups  and prices.  This  is exactly 
the policy behavior  followed by the Home country  in figure  2.7. 
Symmetrically,  in the Foreign  country  the policy problem  is: 
max E[lnC*-K€*]  (39) 
= max  -  E In |x + E In ji* -  -  In E  f-^-  ) -  -  In E  (-^t- ) + constant ,  max  *• [2 
|x  2  \ZJ 
)  2  \Z*J 
) 
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which yields |x*^hp  = a*Z*. Note that  a and a* may differ,  reflecting  na- 
tional preferences  over the desired rate of inflation.  If the two steady- 
state  inflation  rates  are  different,  there  will be a trend  for  the nominal  ex- 
change rate equal to the inflation differential,  without effects on the 
steady-state  real  exchange  rate. 
Are there  gains from  international  policy cooperation?  To  answer this 
question  note that,  with PCP,  the objective  function  of the Home policy- 
makers  in (38)  is identical  to the Foreign  objective  function  (39):  in other 
words, °W  = W*.  Maximizing  an average  of W and W*  yields exactly  the 
same  optimal  policy prescriptions  p^p = <*Z  and |i££^ = a*Z*.  The  non- 
cooperative  rules remain the best policy rules also under cooperation: 
by keeping one's house in order,  so to speak, policymakers  are already 
able to achieve economic  efficiency  (Obstfeld  and Rogoff  2002).  This re- 
sult provides an extreme  version of the case for flexible  exchange  rates 
made by Friedman  (1953):  even without price flexibility,  monetary  au- 
thorities  can engineer  the right  adjustment  in relative  prices  through  ex- 
change  rate  movements.  In our model with PCP,  expenditure-switching 
effects make exchange  rate  and price movements perfect  substitutes.25 
The LCP  Model  The optimality  of inward-looking  policy rules, how- 
ever, is not a general result. Notably,  with LCP,  the optimal policy rule 
still prescribes  some degree of output gap stabilization,  but complete 
stabilization  is not desirable.  Under LCP,  the Home policy problem  in a 
noncooperative  equilibrium  can be written  as: 
max \E In |ji  -  -  In E(-^ ] 
-  -  In E\-^-)  + constant .  (40)  it  [  2  \z/  2  \z  /  J 
The optimal  policy satisfies: 
2 E(^£h/Z)  2  E(n[&/Z*) 
•  (  ) 
Home policymakers  stabilize  a weighted average  of Home and Foreign 
marginal costs, using the CPI weights for the Home and the Foreign 
goods. 
Why? Suppose that the Home monetary authorities  followed an in- 
ward looking rule; that is, they completely stabilized Home marginal 
costs, moving (x  to offset  productivity  shocks  as in figure  2.8.  While  such 
conduct would stabilize domestic producers'  markups, Foreign firms 
selling in the Home country  would face exchange rate variability.  This 
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thus Foreign  consumers'  dividend incomes (with reference  to figure  2.8, 
Foreign  residents  would suffer  large fluctuations  of employment away 
from  the natural  rate). 
Foreign  firms  would then react  to volatility of profits  by raising  their 
average markups in their export markets, charging higher prices for 
their  products sold in the Home country.  The intuition  underlying this 
result  is exactly  the same as discussed in the closed-economy  case, with 
reference  to figure 2.11. In that graph, uncertainty  stemmed directly 
from domestic supply shocks Z. In the LCP case the source of uncer- 
tainty in the Foreign country is exchange rate fluctuations  associated 
with the response of Home policymakers  to domestic shocks. In both 
cases, the optimal response of the producers is to raise markups and 
prices (on average),  in order  to reach  (on average)  full employment. 
Home policymakers thus face a trade-off between stabilizing the 
markups of domestic producers (translating  into lower Home good 
prices) and stabilizing the markups  of Foreign  producers'  (translating 
into lower import  prices).  At an optimum, they will pursue some aver- 
age between the two, depending on the weight of imports in the con- 
sumption basket of Home households. This is precisely the interpreta- 
tion of (41). 
Graphically,  the noncooperative  equilibrium  under  LCP  finds the two 
economies  at points S and S* in figure  2.8. Heuristically,  this point is de- 
termined  as follows. First,  consider the AS locus in the Home country 
after  the realization  of the shock Z (but keeping t unchanged).  Take  the 
horizontal  distance between the NR locus and the AS locus. This dis- 
tance  is zero at point D (incidentally,  this is the same point D as in figure 
2.9)  where the two loci intersect,  and increases  moving downward from 
D to O,  with Home labor  ( below the natural  rate  €. Second,  consider  the 
AS* locus in the Foreign  country and its horizontal distance from the 
NR* locus. This distance is zero at point O* and increases  moving up- 
ward, with €* above the natural rate €*. Starting  from O and O* and 
moving upward,  there  will be a value of consumption  C = C*  such that 
the two employment gaps in the Home and Foreign countries offset 
each other.  This corresponds  to the segment SR in the Home country, 
equal to R*S*  in the Foreign  country.  The monetary stances |x and |jl* 
move in tandem to support consumption gains in both countries by 
OR  = O*R*.  These  consumption  gains are  not as high as in the PCP  case 
(points R and R* in figure 2.8 are below points H and H* in figure 2.7). 
World  employment remains unchanged:  the contraction  in the Home 
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rates  and terms  of trade  remain  unchanged  in all countries.  Utility  gains 
are larger  in the Home country  than in the Foreign  country. 
The magnitude of the optimal deviation from inward looking rules 
depends on a country's  degree of trade  openness. In our stylized model, 
half of the domestic consumption expenditure  falls on foreign goods. 
In the case of small and very open economies, there is a strong incen- 
tive to pursue policy rules that  are quite outward oriented.  In large  and 
less open economies,  these considerations  may affect  policy design only 
marginally. 
In  more  general  terms,  the optimal  policy prescription  could be stated 
in terms of targeting  a weighted average of markups,  assigning higher 
weights (other  things equal)  to the core sectors  in which nominal  rigidi- 
ties are more pronounced.  In the PCP  case, import  prices are fully flex- 
ible while domestic prices are sticky,  so that the optimal monetary  pol- 
icy only stabilizes domestic markups. In the LCP case both domestic 
and import prices are sticky, and the optimal policy targets the CPI- 
weighted average  of the markups. 
Because  of the international  spillovers  of monetary  policy on interna- 
tional  pricing,  one may expect that  with LCP  there  will always be an in- 
centive to cooperate.  Surprisingly,  however, this is not the case in our 
model. To see why, note that the objective  function of Foreign  policy- 
makers  is identical  to (40),  except that In jljl  is replaced  by In jx*.  Hence, 
the noncooperative  optimal  policy satisfies: 
1  m.T£S/z 1  uSSS/z*  = 
2E(m*K/Z)  2E(m.TS/Z*) 
=  *  l  ' 
Comparing  (41)  with (42)  shows that  both  policymakers  stabilize  exactly 
the same  weighted average  of Home and Foreign  marginal  costs.  Hence, 
they pursue exactly the same monetary  policy, |x^h = |x*!£hp,  implying 
that  the nominal  exchange  rate  does not react  to shocks.  Instead  of clos- 
ing the domestic  output  gap completely,  national  policymakers  take  into 
account  the effects of their  policies on exchange  rate  variability.  In equi- 
librium, an efficient monetary rule limits exchange rate fluctuations 
(Devereux  and Engel  2003). 
Solving the cooperative  problem  does not change this prescription  at 
all. There are no gains from cooperation  not because domestic policy- 
making  is already  efficient  (as in the PCP  case, where there  are no spill- 
overs in equilibrium),  but because  what can  be achieved  by cooperating 
(the  stability  or predictability  of the exchange  rate)  is already  achieved  in 
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stem from exchange rate movements, the world economy cannot gain 
by pursuing  asymmetric  policies that imply exchange  rate  fluctuations. 
Once  again,  keeping  one's  house in order  is the best rule of conduct. 
The DP Model  An interesting case of asymmetric deviation from 
inward-looking  rules  is provided  by an economy with Dollar  Pricing.  In 
this case, Home welfare  is equal to (40),  so that  Home optimal  monetary 
policy must satisfy (41). Foreign  welfare is (38). Correspondingly,  the 
Foreign  optimal policy is completely inward-looking.  So, the country 
that issues the currency  used worldwide for export pricing (the Home 
country)  optimally  responds to shocks hitting the global economy.  The 
other  country  only needs to stabilize  domestic  markups. 
The interest  in this case mainly concerns  its implication  for the desir- 
ability of international  policy cooperation. World welfare indeed in- 
creases  when monetary  policy rules are designed in a cooperative  way 
(by maximizing an equally weighted average of the two national wel- 
fare functions).  However, the cooperative  and noncooperative  optimal 
policy rules coincide for the Foreign country,  but not for the Home 
country.  The  contribution  to cooperation  is therefore  unilateral:  only the 
Home country  is expected to modify its rules.  This raises an interesting 
issue as to whether there is any incentive for this country to enter any 
binding cooperative  agreement  regarding  stabilization  policy. 
2.7  Conclusion 
It is hard to deny that the new paradigm  of choice-theoretic  models has 
been contributing  many empirical  and theoretical  elements to our un- 
derstanding  of the international  transmission  of productivity,  monetary 
and financial  shocks,  the sign and magnitude  of cross-border  spillovers, 
as well as the determinants  and cyclical  properties  of interna-tional  trade 
in goods, services,  and assets. Recent  contributions  explore  the implica- 
tions of frictions  in the asset and credit  markets,  attempt  to integrate  fi- 
nancial  and real aspects of the international  transmission,  and address 
crucial  stylized facts of the international  economy,  from the low degree 
of international  risk-sharing  documented  by Backus  and Smith  (1993)  to 
the excess volatility  of real exchange  rates  to the dynamics  of compara- 
tive advantages in the world economy (Chari,  Kehoe, and McGrattan 
2002;  Ghironi  and Melitz 2005;  Corsetti,  Dedola, and Leduc 2004). At 
the same time, pressing policy issues are raising the hurdles for DSGE 
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to global imbalances (Erceg,  Gust, and Guerrieri  2005; Faruqee  et al. 
2007). 
This paper has presented a stylized but rigorous framework  that il- 
lustrates fundamental traits of the recent stabilization  literature,  and 
sheds light on the architecture  of fully-fledged quantitative  models in 
international  macroeconomics.  As DSGE  models are increasingly  used 
as tools for  policy evaluation  by domestic  and international  institutions, 
one of the goals of this paper  is to provide an introductory  set of analyt- 
ical instruments  to convey the main ideas about  international  transmis- 
sion and stabilization  policies underlying these models, as well as to 
provide a smorgasbord  of basic questions  and intuitions  that  are devel- 
oped in quantitative  work. 
While for the sake of analytical  tractability  throughout the text we 
have abstracted  from dynamic considerations,  it is worth emphasizing 
that our results  would qualitatively  go through  in richer  model specifi- 
cations;  for  instance,  in models with staggered  price  setting.  The  optimal 
policy for the PCP  model derived in section 2.6.3  would be identical  in 
our economy if firms adjusted  prices with constant  probability  in each 
period (i.e., according  to the Calvo process).  Since  monetary  authorities 
stabilize domestic marginal  costs in nominal terms, there would be no 
incentive  for any firm  to change its product  price  at any time:  firms  able 
to reoptimize  would post exactly  the same price  as firms  unable  to reset 
their price. The exchange rate would move with the relative stance of 
monetary  policy,  keeping the terms  of trade  in line with the flex-price  al- 
location  (Clarida,  Gali,  and Gertler  2001). 
In the LCP case, we have seen in the text that the previously men- 
tioned strategy (optimal for the PCP case) would translate  into ineffi- 
cient average prices. With staggered price setting, however, it would 
also produce welfare-reducing  price dispersion  in the import  sector,  as 
only some foreign  firms  would be able to adjust  their  prices  in response 
to fluctuations in exchange rates (Smets and Wouters  2002, Corsetti, 
Dedola, and Leduc,  forthcoming).  So, imported  goods that  are  symmet- 
ric in production  and preferences  would be sold, inefficiently,  at differ- 
ent prices.  Depending on the degree of openness of the economy,  mon- 
etary  authorities  could improve  welfare  by trading  off lower prices  and 
less price dispersion in the imports  market,  against some dispersion  in 
the market  for domestically  produced  goods. The design of optimal  sta- 
bilization policies would therefore be concerned with minimizing a 
weighted average of inefficient  misalignment  of relative prices across 
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on the international  dimensions of optimal monetary  policy discussed 
in the text. 
Before  drawing strong  conclusions  from the LCP  versus PCP  debate, 
however, it is worth stressing that models where deviations from the 
law of one price are an exclusive implication  of nominal rigidities (and 
therefore  a short-run  phenomenon)  may overlook persistent  price dis- 
crepancies  across regions or over time, and overestimate  the degree of 
nominal inertia required to explain the stability in local currency of 
import prices. A promising way to address these issues appears in re- 
cent models that  allow for distribution  services  intensive in local inputs 
or local assembling of imported intermediate  inputs (Erceg  and Levin 
1995;  McCallum  and Nelson 1999;  MacDonald  and Ricci  2001;  Burstein, 
Neves, and Rebelo  2003;  Corsetti,  Dedola, and Leduc  2004;  Corsetti  and 
Dedola  2005).  Assessing  the relative  importance  of optimal  price  discrim- 
ination and monetary  frictions  in generating  incomplete pass-through 
is clearly  a relevant  goal for future  research. 
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Notes 
1. Throughout  the paper we maintain  the Aggregate  Demand  /Aggregate Supply con- 
ceptual  apparatus  of most macro  textbooks,  although  our graphical  approach  is closer  in 110  Corsetti and Pesenti 
spirit to the microeconomic  treatment of input/output  relations. Thus, readers used  to 
thinking about Aggregate  Supply in reference to the relation between  the price level and 
output, or inflation and the output gap, may prefer to consider our AS schedule as the con- 
sumption-employment  relation implied by the technology  of production. 
2.  In Corsetti and Pesenti 2005b, appendix  1, we  consider  some  examples  of policy  in- 
struments corresponding  to a given stance (x. 
3.  If the labor market were imperfectly competitive,  there would  be a wedge  (labor mar- 
ket markup) between  real wage  and  marginal  rate of substitution,  reflecting workers' 
market power. 
4.  This result can be easily extended  to the case of nonlinear disutility of labor effort. Sup- 
pose for instance that U = In C - k€1+7(1 +  v). In this case the natural rate of employment 
is a constant equal to [(6 -  1)/6k]1/1+v.  For more general model specifications,  the natural 
rate need not be constant, and consequently  the graphical representation of the equilib- 
rium allocation turns out to be less straightforward. For a generalization  of our graphical 
apparatus to the case in which the natural rate depends  on consumption  see Corsetti and 
Pesenti (1997). 
5.  Product prices are optimally preset to maximize the discounted  value of the firm's prof- 
its. While in general this problem is quite complex, it greatly simplifies in our setting. 
6.  In what follows,  £(X) will refer to the expected value of the variable X based on infor- 
mation available at the time expectations  are taken. With one-period  nominal  rigidities, 
the expression  £(X) is shorthand for E^X,). 
7.  The ex-post gross markup is P/(W/Z),  or 0/(6  - 1) X E(W/Z)/(W/Z).  As long as 6 >  1 
and the shocks are not too large, firms' ex-post markups will remain above one. Note that 
in a model without monopolistic  distortions any increase in marginal cost would lower the 
ex-post markup below one, prompting firms to adjust their prices in response to the shock: 
in that framework, nominal rigidities would  be inconsistent with the rational behavior of 
firms. 
8.  In more complex  models,  expected employment  need not be at the natural rate in any 
period. Nevertheless,  optimal price setting is such that employment  converges  to the nat- 
ural rate asymptotically. 
9.  An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation in which some other indi- 
vidual is better off and no individual  is worse off. 
10. With P fixed during the period, there is no short-run inflation (deflation) in response 
to positive  (negative) output gaps. However, one could obtain some responsiveness  of the 
AD schedule to productivity  shocks by allowing  for an imperfect degree of short-run price 
flexibility  without  changing  the message  from our results above.  For instance, if prices 
could partially respond to excess supply, a fall in the price level would  somewhat  raise the 
AD schedule, moving  the equilibrium allocation closer to the natural rate. 
11. See Tille 2001 for a theoretical extension of this setup and Bergin 2003 for an empirical 
assessment  of similar models. 
12.  For this reason, nominal price rigidities do not necessarily  rule out endogenous  fluc- 
tuations in the consumer price indexes P and P*, which may reflect movements  in import 
prices in response to appreciation or depreciation of the currency. For instance, given |x, an 
increase in e may raise the Foreign good price in domestic currency, thus reducing Home 
aggregate demand. However, such imported inflation would  affect not only the level, but The  Simple  Geometry  of Transmission  and Stabilization  111 
also the composition  of consumer  demand.  In fact, Home consumption  would  switch in 
favor of the now cheaper domestic good. 
13. What would  happen  if we  relaxed the balanced  trade assumption?  In principle, na- 
tional residents  in the two  countries  would  benefit from having  access  to international 
financial markets, trading securities  whose  payoffs  move  in tandem  with  the domestic 
shocks, and reducing  the exposure  of their wealth  and consumption  to national sources 
of risk. Consider  the opposite  extreme case of complete  international  asset markets. In 
this case, the ratio of the marginal utilities of Home and Foreign consumption  in any state 
of nature must be proportional to the relative price of consumption  (i.e., the real exchange 
rate): 
dU*/dC*  =  P*e 
dU/dC  ~P~' 
Now,  given  the specification  of utility in (1) and its Foreign analog, the risk-sharing ex- 
pression above can be written exactly as (15)! Cole and Obstfeld 1991 show that under con- 
dition isomorphic to our parameterization, movements  in the terms of trade are sufficient 
to guarantee full consumption  risk-sharing across countries exactly as if agents had access 
to a system of transfers contingent to the realization of the shocks. 
14.  It is worth restating that, for these differences to be a feature of a market equilibrium, 
one needs to assume that no agent in the economy  can take advantage of arbitrage oppor- 
tunities in the goods  markets. 
15. A new generation of models are revisiting the implications  of productivity  shocks on 
the terms of trade when  accounting  for creation and trade of new  product varieties. The 
analysis of this section only focuses on the intensive  margin of trade; that is, the interna- 
tional performance of sectors producing  a given set of varieties, without  studying  the ex- 
tensive margin associated with new traded products. See Bergin and Glick 2003; Ghironi 
and Melitz 2005; and Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti 2007. 
16. This general  principle  is subject to a number  of caveats,  as optimal  exchange  rate 
regimes  depend  in  practice  on  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  country  and  time 
(Frankel 1999). 
17. From a global perspective,  the effect of the Home monetary expansion  can be broken 
down  into two  components.  The first component  is symmetric  and affects the level  of 
world demand: a looser monetary stance at Home translates into a looser monetary stance 
for the world economy  as a whole,  raising consumption  worldwide.  The second compo- 
nent is instead asymmetric and affects the composition  of world demand.  The monetary 
stance is relatively more expansionary at Home, depreciating the exchange rate, and redi- 
recting world demand towards Home goods. 
18.  For instance, in Albanesi,  Chari, and Christiano (2003) inflation leads  to a costly  re- 
duction  in consumption  purchases because  of the operation of the cash in advance  con- 
straint. 
19. Comparing (29) with (30), an increase in trade openness  has effects similar to those of 
the fiscal subsidy considered before. There is, however, an important difference. In closed 
economy  the socially  optimal  level  of employment  is higher  than the natural rate and 
equal to the competitive  level 1  /k; an appropriate subsidy  allows the competitive  level to 
be supported in a time-consistent equilibrium. Openness instead reduces the gap between 
socially optimal employment  and natural rate €. This makes it easier -  but does not guar- 
antee -  for the socially  optimal  level  to be supported  in a time-consistent  equilibrium. 112  Corsetti  and Pesenti 
Appropriate  fiscal  instruments  are  still required,  unless by chance  openness  and monop- 
olistic  distortions  happen  to exactly  offset  each  other. 
20. It is worth mentioning  another  dimension  of the relationship  between globalization 
and inflation.  If  globalization  increases  the  degree  of competition  in the  economy  and low- 
ers average  markups  (i.e., moves 6 upward),  then it also reduces  the gap between com- 
petitive and natural  output. As the distance  between O and X shrinks  in figure  2.10,  so 
does the underlying  inflationary  bias (Rogoff  2007). 
21. In expression  (35),  a need not be constant  over time:  it can represent  any determinis- 
tic  process  that  firms  are  able  to predict  at the time  they  take  their  expectations.  Adao,  Cor- 
reia,  and Teles  (2005)  provide conditions  that rule out indeterminacy,  so that the equilib- 
rium is unique. In our framework,  this follows from  perfect  commitment  by the central 
bank,  implying  that  a provides  a credible  nominal  anchor  to private  sector  expectations. 
22. It would be straightforward  to restate  the results above in terms of inflation  rates 
rather  than price levels. Suppose that the monetary  authorities  set the nominal anchor 
according  to a = P_,(l + it), where  P1  is the lagged  price  level observed  at the time  expec- 
tations  are  taken,  and iris the desired  rate  of inflation  -  that  is, the (implicit  or explicit)  in- 
flation  target  of the policymakers,  which may be equal to zero. Given the above nominal 
anchor,  in the absence  of shocks (Z = 1) firms  would optimally  set their  prices  equal to 
a in each period  and the economy  would exhibit  a constant  inflation  rate  equal to ttt;  that 
is, P/P_x  = (1 + tt).  But  this is precisely  the outcome  that  would prevail  in the presence  of 
shocks  to Z, provided  that  the monetary  authorities  implement  (35). 
23. Our  intuitive  graphical  analysis  can be easily checked  using the pricing  equation  di- 
rectly.  Holding (x  = a, the equilibrium  price  level is: 
*=a e-i  \z)  e-i 
since,  with £(Z) = 1, £(1/Z) > 1. As a straightforward  implication  of the  Jensen's  inequal- 
ity the optimal  price  is above  our candidate  expression  on the right-hand  side:  the preset 
price  level is increasing  in the variance  of the productivity  shock. 
24. Similar  considerations  go through  in standard  models with price rigidities.  For in- 
stance,  in the absence  of policy  stabilization  lower  utility  and  higher  inflation  volatility  are 
the results  of inefficient  dispersion  of prices  and activities  among  producers  under  price 
staggering.  In principle,  one cannot  rule  out that  for  particular  parameterizations  of pref- 
erences and technology,  suboptimal  stabilization  policies put downward pressure on 
prices.  However,  the specifications  commonly  adopted  by the literature  yield results  con- 
sistent  with the one discussed  in the text. 
25. The equivalence  between Nash equilibrium  and flex-price  allocation  need not go 
through  under  more  general  conditions;  for  example,  with less restrictive  preference  spec- 
ifications  as shown by Benigno  and Benigno  2003. 
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